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Four hostile newspapers are more to be feared than a thousand bayonets. 
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Abstract. The author examines the coverage of two simultaneously 
occurring battles, Mosul and Aleppo, in the Western media. Although both 
battles are intended to be key moments in defeating terrorist 
organisations, there is a stark contrast in the Western media`s framing of 
these events. In order to analyse the vast gaps in the coverage of these 
battles, the lens of news management, which is a means to influence 
public perception and opinion, is employed to view these two distinct 
events in Iraq and Syria. The author concludes that news management is 
applied to the information flows in these events in order to shape public 
opinion and perception of the battles Mosul and Aleppo—one ‘good’ and 
the other ‘bad.’ 
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УДК 327 
 
«ХОРОШИЕ» И «ПЛОХИЕ» СРАЖЕНИЯ: СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ 
ОСВЕЩЕНИЯ ЗАПАДНЫМИ СМИ БИТВ ЗА МОСУЛ И АЛЕППО 
 
Аннотация. Автор анализирует освещение западными средствами 
массовой информации двух происходящих одновременно сражений – 
за Мосул и за Алеппо. Несмотря на то, что оба сражения задуманы как 
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знаковые события в борьбе с террористическими организациями, 
наблюдается значительный контраст в их подаче западными СМИ. 
Исследование специфики принципиальных различий в освещении 
данных сражений в Ираке и Сирии проводится с точки зрения 
применения технологий менеджмента новостей, который предполагает 
использование инструментов воздействия на общественные 
восприятие и мнение. Автор приходит к выводу о том, что менеджмент 
новостей применяется для регулирования новостного потока о данных 
событиях для того, чтобы формировать общественные восприятие и 
мнение об одном из них как о «хорошем», а о другом – как о «плохом».   
 
Ключевые слова: средства массовой информации, менеджмент 
новостей, сражение за Мосул, сражение за Алеппо. 
 
 
Introduction  
Media content related to the topic of war is political in nature and in 
its ability to influence political outcomes. Therefore, modern armed 
conflicts and mass media become intertwined. “Indeed, the nature of 
contemporary conflict, coupled with the character of contemporary 
communications, means that the image […] has become the key weapon in 
modern war” (Michalski & Gow 2007, 222). As noted historically by the 
likes of Sun Tzu and von Clausewitz, war is politics by another means. It 
affects the tangible (physical) and intangible (psychological) elements of 
war (Simons 2012).  
Wars have been portrayed and projected as being good or bad at 
certain points in time, and this may even change in terms of the ethical 
judgement as space and time progresses. Information spaces help to shape 
the perception and the opinion of an audience, but this is contingent upon 
a number of different factors that are present in the human and 
informational environment.  
This paper works from the premise that media is an instrument of 
war, which was asserted by Kenneth Payne. Such an assertion runs 
counter to the popular mantra that media is a fourth estate. The political 
connection to war makes public perception and opinion either a useful ally 
or a problematic complication. As media are the supposed eyes and ears of 
the public to remote events, it is the ideal environment to manipulate 
information flows in order to shape a political agenda (Simons 2016). Two 
simultaneously occurring battles, Aleppo and Mosul, and their coverage in 
the Western media are examined and analysed.  
The lens to view these two distinct events in Iraq and Syria shall be 
news management, which is a means to influence public perception and 
opinion. This will be done with the question in mind, why are there such 
vast gaps in the framing of these two events when both of the battles are 
intended to be key moments in defeating terrorist organisations? Each of 
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the battles shall be taken in turn after the basic theoretical arguments and 
foundations of this paper have been established.  
 
Media, War and Politics 
Media have a complicated history and relationship with war. Three 
key narratives of the role of mainstream media in communicating conflict 
have been identified: “as critical observer, publicist, and most recently, as 
battleground, the surface upon which war is imagined and executed” 
(Thussu & Freedman 2003, 4). Their fourth estate function should compel 
them to be critical of the government message and to serve public interest, 
yet pressures, such as the demand for public unity and patriotism, reduce 
such opportunities during periods of armed conflict. BBC producer 
Kenneth Payne outlines the function of the media succinctly: “The media, 
in the modern era, are indisputably an instrument of war. This is because 
winning modern wars is as much dependent on carrying domestic and 
international public opinion as it is on defeating the enemy on the 
battlefield (Payne 2005, 81).” 
The above mentioned situation creates a problem for society as 
media and journalists create a situation in which little or no debate exists 
and in which professional ethics of the profession are readily abandoned 
as part of the wider war effort. This situation has been observed by others: 
“In a period where diversity of opinion was possible, the newspapers’ 
editorials mirrored the official policy, even when this was undermined. A 
pattern that has expanded as the conflicts escalated” (Willcox 2005, 90). 
To argue for absolute objectivity is a utopian dream, but there does need to 
be a greater debate and level of awareness of the pros and cons of a 
situation, especially when moving towards military conflict:  
 
Rather than playing a critical role in questioning 
American engagement in foreign wars, the mass media has 
traditionally promoted an image of the U.S. as committed to 
promoting democracy and human rights. While the 
promotion of pro-war views is not a problem in-and-of-itself, 
the systematic denial of alternative interpretations for 
American motives does constitute a serious impediment to 
efforts in achieving more balanced reporting and informed 
public debate (DiMaggio 2009, 77). 
 
A number of trends have been observed above in how media set 
about reporting on armed conflict, which confirms Payne’s assertion that 
media are an instrument of war. Carruthers notes the “news organisations’ 
tendency to allow political elites to set the agenda; the potency of 
patriotism to muffle dissent and curb debate; the willingness of media to 
discipline one another; and professional norms of objectivity and balance 
that appear to institutionalise, rather than eliminate, certain forms of bias” 
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(Carruthers 2011, 43). Other trends have been noted too. The greater 
mediatisation of conflict has brought about a number of dynamics, 
namely: amplification, framing and performative agency, and co-
structuring (Hjarvard et al. 2015, 4). These have led to an evolution in 
armed conflicts and the following aspects were noted and categorised as 
being influential on public perception and reception. Conduits refers to 
how “media may expand and amplify conflicts across time and space, that 
is, increase the speed, geographical reach, and level of involvement in 
armed conflicts.” In terms of languages, “media may be used to frame 
conflicts, allowing diverse social actors to perform in particular ways and 
resulting in a particular dramaturgy of the conflict in question.” 
Environment is also a factor: “media are an integral to various social 
institutions and at the same time constitute a public sphere” (Ibid., 9). 
Therefore, the means of sending a message, the nature of the message’s 
content, and the wider social and political environment in which the acts 
of communication take place all contribute to the relative success of the 
act (in which success is measured in terms of influence over the opinions 
and actions of a target audience in the desired manner of the message 
communicator). It is a difficult balance that is dependent upon timing and 
circumstance occurring within the environment of the intended target 
audience. Sometimes this is conducted under the conditions of deception 
and falsehood. The ability to successfully wage war is based upon the 
ability to control the information environment, and consequently the 
information, perceptions, and opinions of the public to create a façade of 
ethical and political legitimacy: 
 
A veritable vacuum of responsibility arises from the 
hierarchical structure of the military: fallible leaders wage 
wars based upon false premises (above all, that there is no 
alternative), and the people support and soldiers execute 
military missions on the basis of omissive descriptions of 
what war entails (Calhoun 2013, 165).  
 
This creates what some refer to as the fog of war: “Today, however, 
the battlefield is superimposed upon civilian societies, generating a thick 
fog in which the guilty and the innocent, combatants and non-combatants 
are jumbled together chaotically” (Calhoun 2013, 165). Complexity goes 
against the human desire to break situations down into “understandable” 
news bites, which simplifies complex situations, often in an intentionally 
subjective manner that can benefit the political agenda of an actor.  
In an effort to make a complex event more “understandable,” the role 
of the conduit and language are of critical importance in conveying an 
intended (as opposed to a random or unintended) meaning that shapes 
perception and opinion in the target audience. The combined effect of 
image and text in media content on the media consumer are important, 
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but require something more in order to generate the desired meaning: “It is 
the narrative underpinning a news outlet’s understanding of a specific 
situation that ultimately matters, independent of the language that is used 
to produce that narration, be it verbal or visual” (De Franco 2012, 170). 
Given the current 24/7 news cycle, an actor must continually engage in 
the public information sphere to stand a chance of retaining any possible 
political advantage.  
In order to maintain the initiative and retain the narrative and 
therefore the ability to influence public opinion and perception, those 
seeking a certain policy line need to be proactive in shaping information 
and content in the public information space. If they do not, any advantage 
can be potentially lost: 
 
More importantly, the mere fact that this may happen 
pushes politicians to produce as much information as they 
can with a two-fold objective: 1) to saturate the media and 
lead journalists to use news which is already available 
instead of searching for that which is not; and 2) to keep the 
public quiet with an illusion of transparency (De Franco 
2012, 174). 
 
There are long tested means and methods of achieving this state in 
the public information sphere. News Management is defined as being “the 
strategic communication of messages, via the media, in order to further 
political goals. It is concerned with the control of information, and the way 
in which political information is reported, by political organisations” 
(Lilleker 2011, 131). A political actor can seek an advantage through 
managing information and disclosure through news. The end of the 
manipulation of the news is linked to a “game” of persuasion, which can 
provide a competitive edge over rival interests (Shin 1994). As noted in a 
historical context, such practices can present certain challenges and 
issues. A situation can arise when “the media become a docile conduit for 
the flow of supposedly neutral information to the public, thereby serving 
the ‘national interest’” (Tulloch 1993, 382). Some researchers have 
established a link between news management and the practice of foreign 
policy, in particular strategic public diplomacy: “As the campaigns to 
mobilize support for both US-led wars [the 1991 Gulf War and 2003 Iraq 
War] made clear, strategic public diplomacy is most effective in settings in 
which the level of information held by the public is low and in which the 
operations of strategic communication can be kept out of the public eye” 
(Esser 2009, 731). In addition to laying the groundwork and conditions for 
establishing a “good” or popular war, these very methods could also be 
used to create the requisite intangible conditions for a “bad” or unpopular 
war through a similar campaign, but with the use of negative messaging. A 
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true test of skill and excellence in news management would be to run two 
campaigns simultaneously—one positive and one negative—to characterise 
two different battles being waged at the same time in which one is ‘good’ 
and the other is ‘bad.’  
 
News Management in War 
Two different battles were chosen to test the above idea, whether it is 
possible to engage effectively in news management of two simultaneous 
battles in the same geographical region. Limiting it to ongoing conflicts and 
the need to find one “good” and one “bad” battle greatly reduced the 
number of potential choices. Given the highly political nature of war, the 
“best” and most likely location to find this situation was in the Middle 
East. The current level of geopolitical competition and conflict in the region 
(Saudi Arabia versus Iran, Turkey versus Kurds, US versus Russia) meant 
that there are many ongoing conflicts, but there are few places where there 
are key or iconic battles being fought simultaneously. This excluded many 
of the conflicts, such as Yemen and Afghanistan. Both of these battles 
needed a high profile in terms of news coverage in Western media.  
However, there are two battles that have begun and are being 
narrated as key moments, the success of which could have a decisive effect 
on the outcome of the war. One of these is the Battle of Mosul in Iraq in 
2016, which has been ongoing for some time. The capture of this town is 
being trumpeted as a path to success against the Islamic State. This has 
been framed as the “good” war, one in which human values predominate. 
The other battle is the Battle for Aleppo in Syria in 2016, which is framed 
as a “bad” war, one in which the oppression of human values 
predominates. Both of the battles are being framed as against terrorist 
forces (Al Qaeda in Aleppo and ISIS in Mosul) by those conducting the 
military operations. Yet the framing in Western media differs greatly in its 
ethical judgement of the two events, even though both of these groups are 
considered terrorist organisations in the West. 
Material for the two events was drawn from news articles received 
from headlines emailed to the author, such as Space War (a news 
aggregate), New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, and from 
the news feed on Facebook. In addition, the author conducted basic 
internet searches for the terms “Russian attack on Aleppo 2016” and 
“Attack on Mosul 2016” using the search engine Google. The results were 
manually checked to make sure they met the criteria (Western media news 
outlets, relevance to the individual events). The first ten pages of results 
for each search were examined and analysed. More than 200 news stories 
were read and analysed in the course of the research. The following 
represents a representative sample of the common sets of descriptions and 
narratives of the two battles in question.  
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Aleppo—the ‘Bad’ Battle 
From the very start of the conflict in Syria, the US-led West has 
consistently demanded and worked towards regime change in Syria 
(Simons 2016). This same message continues until now. For example, 
Hillary Clinton stated that “removing President Bashar al-Assad is the top 
priority in Syria.”1 The war in Syria came to Aleppo in July 2012. Given the 
location of the city near the Turkish border on the main land transport 
route, it is a strategic point. In June 2016 Hassan Nasrallah (Hezbollah 
chief) declared that Syria’s “real, strategic, greatest battle is in Aleppo and 
the surrounding area.” In addition, the significance of the battle is also 
stressed by the author of the article: “The stage is prepared for the Syrian 
endgame—a game the rebels look doomed to lose, along with the entire 
anti-Assad revolution.”2 This event is projected by the different sides of this 
conflict as a key and decisive event that shall shape the future of the entire 
conflict for the worse should the Syrian government and Russian military 
forces prevail.  
There are black and white characterisations of the different sides in 
the conflict, the “good rebel” underdogs and the “bad” and oppressive 
Syrian government and Russian forces. Now it is necessary to offer a brief 
and concrete example to illustrate the characterisation of the main actors 
of the conflict in an ethical frame. The movement of Syrian or Russian 
military hardware is projected as sinister and “ominous” with harmful and 
malicious intent.3 As the villains, the Syrian government and Russians are 
suitably cast as ruthless and without mercy or compassion: 
 
Many of the 300,000 plus unfortunates trapped inside 
face the prospect of slowly starving as extortionately-priced 
food, medicine and fuel supplies are systematically blocked. 
Some will die before then from Syrian and Russian 
government barrel-bombing. Latterly supplemented by 
incendiary cluster munitions burning to 2500 C, the 
bombers are steadily eradicating schools, hospitals and 
markets from above with impunity.4  
                                                 
1 “Presidential Candidate Clinton Says Removing Assad in Syria is No. 1 Priority.” 2016. 
Reuters, October 5. Accessed October 10, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
election-clinton-syria-idUSKCN0RZ1C020151005 
2 Darke, D. 2016. “Aleppo: Is Besieged Syrian City Facing Last Grasp?” BBC, July 22. 
Accessed October 25, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36853689 
3 Borger, J. 2016. “Ominous News for Aleppo as Russian Frigate Reaches Syrian Coast.” The 
Guardian, November 4. Accessed November 7, 2016. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/04/russia-further-bolsters-naval-presence-
in-mediterranean 
4 Darke, D. 2016. “Aleppo: Is Besieged Syrian City Facing Last Grasp?” BBC, July 22. 
Accessed October 25, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36853689 
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A lot of assertions and statements are made without any necessary 
support or actual evidence provided by the journalist. The intention, or at 
least the effect, is to paint as negative a picture as possible of the Syrian 
government and their allies in spite of the struggle against terrorist groups, 
such as Al Nusra (now rebranded as Jabhat Fateh Al-Sham), an Al Qaeda 
affiliate operating in the city and which Western media paint in a positive 
light: “Syria’s moderate opposition groups have suffered years of broken 
promises of support from the international community.”5 Another 
important point is the use of deceptive labelling, such as “moderate forces” 
or “rebels.” This is a vague, yet reasonably positive term, which has 
included such forces as Al Nursa in the past. These groups are pictured as 
being a heroic underdog that needs and deserves support to bring about 
regime change.  
From these brief initial observations, it is possible to note clusters of 
frames, events and processes through which news stories further 
propagate a moral and ethical projection of the war, which has a tendency 
to favour the “rebels” and the policy goal of regime change in Syria. 
Military action conducted by the Syrian government and its allies is one of 
the themes, and the “diplomatic” actions of the United States and its allies 
are another central theme. The primary messages in the Western media 
narrative of the Battle for Aleppo are of indiscriminate bombings by the 
Syrian government and Russia, a long suffering civilian population, and 
heroic “rebel” resistance.  
Many of these news stories are based upon the testimony of 
unnamed Syrian “activists,” without divulging the name of the person or 
group or declaring their goals or aims. This seems to be a deliberate 
strategy of hiding the true nature of those people and groups, whilst giving 
the superficial impression of their “objectivity.” One such article, which 
appeared in the Los Angeles Times, provides numerous examples of 
inconsistent logic as the result of news management of two simultaneous 
battles in which one is declared good and the other bad: “At the start of 
that meeting the UN’s top envoy to Syria accused the government of 
unleashing unprecedented military violence against civilians in Aleppo.” 
The term unprecedented remains unqualified and is an unsubstantiated 
assertion, but it sounds menacing. Quotes from political figures are not 
challenged or questioned, but simply reported as being ‘facts’, even though 
opposing views are usually critically challenged in mainstream mass media 
reporting. The offensive is painted as one that is doomed to fail as there is 
no solely “military solution” possible. Western hype is increased through 
accusations of Syrian and Russian war crimes and the possibility of 
bringing individuals in both countries to trial: “France’s Foreign Minister 
Jean-Marc Ayrault said Russia and Iran will be guilty of war crimes if they 
                                                 
5 Darke, D. 2016. “Aleppo: Is Besieged Syrian City Facing Last Grasp?” BBC, July 22. 
Accessed October 25, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-36853689  
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don’t pressure Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad to stop escalating 
violence.” There were even demands made for “mercy” to be shown to the 
so-called rebels: “The statement released by 33 factions called upon the 
government and Russian forces to halt airstrikes and lift sieges on 
opposition areas.”6 The thirty-three factions remain unnamed, along with 
their political and military agenda. The demands are directed at so-called 
opposition areas and not at areas under siege by jihadist forces. The 
sources in this article were only those who opposed the Syrian government 
and the Russian military involvement.  
The picture of the Syrian conflict is far from consistent, especially in 
terms of the quality of journalism. An impression that can be deduced by 
the reporting is of great suffering, although most of the references relate to 
events in the eastern part of the city that is held by Jihadist forces, and 
not the government-held western parts of the city. In one of the rare 
articles that told the other side of the story in Western mainstream media, 
this omission becomes clear. A thirty-year-old student from Western 
Aleppo was interviewed (the identity, age and profession are given): “The 
policy of these Western countries is to destroy the Syrian government, or 
the ‘regime’ as they call it, so they don’t mention what happens in 
government territory … because they don’t want their people to know the 
truth of what is happening in the country.” He notes further: “Western 
channels don’t send their correspondents to government-controlled areas 
because that would be an acknowledgement of the Syrian state.” As noted 
in this article, although the government controls the skies, the jihadist 
forces regularly fire mortars into civilian areas of western Aleppo.7 Another 
article appeared in the New York Times. Although the article tried to paint 
a more normal and better life for people in the government-controlled 
Western Aleppo, it could not completely ignore the human suffering there 
either. The report even gave the official figure of 11,000 civilian deaths in 
Western Aleppo as the result of indiscriminate shelling by anti-Assad 
forces that included a mixture of Al Qaeda and US-backed groups.8 These 
particular news articles hint at the perception of an existing media 
dichotomy between those whose misery is worthy of publicising and others 
who are unworthy, which hints at the possibility of a political agenda in 
which media are being used according to Payne as an instrument of war.  
                                                 
6 Associated Press. “Bombing Campaign Leaves Aleppo Hospitals Overwhelmed as UN Meets 
Over Syria.” 2016. Los Angeles Times, September 25. Accessed September 26, 2016. 
www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-syrian-rebels-aleppo-government-20160925-snap-story.html  
7 Bulos, N. 2016. “In Coverage of Syrian War, Residents of Government-Held West Aleppo Feel 
the World Has Forgotten Them.” Los Angeles Times, September 1. Accessed September 2, 
2016. www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-syria-aleppo-media-war-20160830-snap-
htmlstory.html 
8 Barnard, A. 2016. “‘I Saw My Father Dying’: A View From Aleppo’s Government Held Side.” 
The New York Times, November 4. Accessed November 7, 2016. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/05/world/middleeast/aleppo-syria.html 
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From news article headlines, it is clear that an offensive began by the 
Syrian government to take Aleppo back from the jihadist forces. Some of 
the headlines can be somewhat neutral in their tone, such as “Syrian 
Government Troops Launch Ground Assault to Retake Aleppo” and 
“Moscow Sends More Warplanes into Syria as Aleppo Fighting Rages.”9 
Other news headlines do little to mask their political partisanship through 
value and ethically laden suggestive rhetoric: “Russia’s Brutal Bombing of 
Aleppo May be Calculated, and it May be Working.” This article notes that 
“the effects of Russia’s bombing campaign in the Syrian city of Aleppo—
destroying hospitals and schools, choking off basic supplies, and killing 
aid workers and hundreds of civilians over just days—raise a question: 
what could possibly motivate such brutality?”10 The type of rhetoric is 
heavily laden in pathos and reliant on assertion rather than evidence, or 
based on sources that have a distinct bias and political interest in the 
conflict, such as the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Other 
emotionally laden headlines include, “As Aleppo Burns, Assad’s Henchmen 
Live a Life of Luxury in the West: Godfathers of the Syrian Regime Flit 
Between Paris, Marbella and Mayfair as Their Country is Locked in a 
Bloody Civil War”,11 “In Push on Aleppo, Syria and Russia Seem Ready to 
Further Scorch its Earth”,12 “His Grip Still Secure, Bashar al-Assad Smiles 
as Syria Burns”,13 “Worse Than Hell: Russia, Syrian Regime Stepping up 
                                                 
9 Bulos, N. 2016. “Syrian Government Troops Launch Ground Assault to Retake Aleppo.” Los 
Angeles Times, September 27. Accessed September 28, 2016. 
www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-syria-ground-assault-20160927-snap-story.html, 
27 September 2016; “Warplanes into Syria as Aleppo Fighting Rages.” 2016. Deutsche Welle, 
October 1. Accessed October 20, 2016. http://www.dw.com/en/moscow-to-send-more-
warplanes-into-syria-as-aleppo-fighting-rages/a-35937653 
10 Fisher, M. 2016. “Russia’s Brutal Bombing of Aleppo May be Calculated, and it May be 
Working.” The New York Times, September 28. Accessed October 20, 2016. 
www.nytimes.com/2016/09/29/world/middleeast/russias-brutal-bombing-of-aleppo-may-
be-calculated-and-it-may-be-working.html 
11 Robertson, A. 2016. “As Aleppo Burns, Assad’s Henchmen Live a Life of Luxury in the West: 
Godfathers of the Syrian Regime Flit Between Paris, Marbella and Mayfair as Their Country is 
Locked in a Bloody Civil War.” Daily Mail, October 16. Accessed October 20, 2016. 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3840978/As-Aleppo-burns-Assad-s-henchmen-
live-life-luxury-West-Godfathers-Syrian-regime-flit-Paris-Marbella-Mayfair-country-locked-
bloody-civil-war.html 
12 Barnard, A., and S. Sengupta. 2016. “In Push on Aleppo, Syria and Russia Seem Ready to 
Further Scorch its Earth.” The New York Times, September 25. Accessed September 26, 2016. 
www.nytimes.com/2016/09/26/world/middleeast/syria-un-security-council.html 
13 Hubbard, B. 2016. “His Grip Still Secure, Bashar al-Assad Smiles as Syria Burns.” The 
New York Times, September 17. Accessed September 19, 2016. 
www.nytimes.com/2016/09/18/world/middleeast/his-position-still-secure-bashar-al-assad-
smiles-as-syria-burns.html 
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Aleppo Fight,”14 “Russia Accused of Supporting ‘Barbarism’ Over Syrian 
Conflict,”15 and “Aleppo Battered as Russia Slams ‘Unacceptable’ 
Rhetoric.”16 There is also little balance in the content of these articles, 
which give only one subjective side of the story without any context and 
with various assertions and accusations to back the emotional rhetoric. 
Russia and the Syrian government are clearly projected as the villains of 
this story. There is also an attempt to project the “rebels” as fighting for 
freedom and the US-led West as objective brokers for the sake of 
humanity.  
An iconic moment that was created to perpetuate these images and 
projected reality can be found in the reporting and rhetoric around 
ceasefires. The end of the ceasefire in October 2016 created an atmosphere 
of value-based lobbying through media reporting on the issue. Russia and 
Syria were already projected as being inhumane aggressors and the 
reporting reflected this narrative. One such blatant example appeared in 
the Daily Mail: “As a Gesture of Goodwill We Won’t Bomb You (Today): 
Russia and Syria Announce Temporary Ceasefire Over Aleppo ‘That will 
Last Eight Hours,’” which occurred after heavy criticism by Western media 
that the Syrian government never allowed ceasefires.17 The ceasefire was 
also projected as being a lost opportunity, such as the evacuation of 
civilians from eastern Aleppo held by the jihadist forces.18 Many media 
articles placed the blame for the failure of the ceasefire solely on Russia 
and Syria, with at least one notable exception: “The Syrian military called 
off a ceasefire agreement that began last week, a decision it blamed on 
rebel groups, but was likely affected by a US bombing mission that killed 
                                                 
14 Shinkman, P. 2016. “Worse Than Hell: Russia, Syrian Regime Stepping Up Aleppo Fight.” 
US News, September 26. Accessed September 27, 2016. 
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15 Solomon, E., and G. Dyer. 2016. “Russia Accused of Supporting ‘Barbarism’ Over Syrian 
Conflict.” Financial Times, September 25. Accessed September 26, 2016. 
https://www.ft.com/content/cdd5f09c-831d-11e6-a29c-6e7d9515ad15 
16 Al-Masri, K., and L. A. Rahal. 2016. “Aleppo Battered as Russia Slams ’Unacceptable’ 
Rhetoric.” Space War, September 27. Accessed September 28, 2016. 
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_999.html 
17 Robinson, J. 2016. “As a Gesture of Goodwill We Won’t Bomb You (Today): Russia and 
Syria Announce Temporary Ceasefire Over Aleppo ‘That will Last Eight Hours’.” Daily Mail, 
October 19. Accessed October 20, 2016. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
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Accessed October 24, 2016. 
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“Fresh Fighting in Aleppo as Ceasefire Ends Without Evacuations.” 2016. Deutsche Welle, 
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Syrian government forces over the weekend.”19 The author makes clear 
reference to the US airstrike that was responsible for the deaths of 
numerous Syrian soldiers and that enabled ISIS to capture a Syrian 
military base that was bombed during the ceasefire.  
Western media reporting takes significant time and effort to project 
the West as a humanitarian force in the conflict. Various media reports 
make mention of the concern expressed by Western political leaders, and 
Russian aggression in the face of Western humanism.20 However, some 
contradictions in the narrative exist. Whilst the West projects itself as the 
saviour and Russia and Syria as the villains, this façade gets challenged in 
some of the solutions to the violence that are offered to the public. This 
ranges from threats by the US government to unilaterally stop diplomatic 
efforts with Russia, to talk of direct and overt military intervention in Syria 
against Russia and the Syrian government to stop the killing.21 There 
seems to be little consideration given in these political statements to the 
effects on the ground of foreign political and military interference on the 
civilians living within the government-controlled areas.  
                                                 
19 Phippen, J. W. 2016. “The End of the Syrian Ceasefire.” The Atlantic, September 19. 
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Rises as US Halts Syria Negotiations.” The New York Times, October 3. Accessed October 4, 
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russia-on-syria.html; Watts, J. 2016. “UK and US Both Consider Military Options Amid 
Warnings Russia Will ‘Flatten’ Aleppo.” The Independent, October 13. Accessed October 20, 
2016. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/us-uk-military-action-russia-syria-
bombing-aleppo-a7360226.html; Rogin, J. 2016. “Obama Administration Considering Strikes 
on Assad, Again.” The Washington Post, October 4. Accessed October 5, 2016. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2016/10/04/obama-
administration-considering-strikes-on-assad-again/?utm_term=.aeea366825d8 
Gregory Simons. ‘Good’ Battles and ‘Bad’ Battles…  
 
126 
Some signs of critical reflection periodically surface in Western 
media reporting concerning aspects of the Syrian conflict. One of the 
articles noted was from the Los Angeles Times and dealt with the 
challenges and the dilemmas the US faced in getting involved in the Syrian 
war in a more open and direct form, including how to deal with the growth 
of the jihadist group Fateh al-Sham: “In recent weeks, US intelligence has 
detected signs that al Qaeda operatives in Syria are plotting attacks 
against the West, raising concerns that the hard-line Islamist group has 
escaped scrutiny for too long, according to two US intelligence officials who 
spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive information”22. This 
fits with the US’s short-term vision for Syria that seemingly is focused 
narrowly on regime change. This point has been noted by others: “Yet the 
horrific tragedy now unfolding in Syria is partially the result of the West’s 
tacit and overt support for the overthrow of Syria’s secular government by 
radical Sunni fundamentalists. This has been, in effect, US policy in Syria, 
and it runs directly counter to US national-security interests.”23 
 
Mosul—the ‘Good’ Battle  
In June 2014, ISIS captured the Iraqi city of Mosul and soon 
afterwards declared a caliphate24. A number of military offensives have 
been attempted by Iraqi and Kurdish forces in 2015 and 2016. The most 
recent began on October 16, 2016, with the operational name “We Are 
Coming, Nineveh” (named after the governorate that surrounds Mosul).25 
Coalition forces opposing ISIS maintain a 10:1 numerical advantage.26 The 
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Battle for Mosul is projected as a key event that can turn the tide against 
ISIS and its caliphate. Mosul is often described as the jewel in the Islamic 
State’s crown.27 US air support in this battle is characterised in very 
different terms to Russian air support in Aleppo: “They’re like a skilful 
surgeon removing a cancer.”28 First and foremost, this is characterised and 
narrated by politicians, military officials, and the mass media as a battle 
for the liberation of the local population. It is done rhetorically with a 
certain sense of inevitability in the eventual outcome: “After losing several 
key cities in Iraq and also in Syria, the jihadists’ ‘state’ is already looking 
threadbare and the loss of Mosul would all but seal its disintegration.”29 
The general tone of Western media about this military offensive is that it is 
a good battle, which is expressed in a number of emphasized aspects, such 
as the local population, the nature and weakness of ISIS, and the strength 
and skill of allied forces with their “humanitarian” approach.  
One of the lines of reporting in the Battle for Mosul is that this is 
done for the good of the local population in order to liberate them from an 
oppressive occupier. At times this is done with a tinge of caution: “The 
reality is more complex than many assume. Without a peace plan and 
counter-narrative that involves all the peoples of Iraq, victory will be partial 
and short-lived.”30 One of the images painted is that of a military offensive 
that is taking all steps possible to minimise civilian casualties, for 
example, stories of the evacuation of civilians from villages in the path of 
the offensive.31 There is a picture of life returning to a sense of normality 
and a sense of relief by residents freed from ISIS rule.32 The humanity of 
the coalition forces is contrasted with the inhumanity of ISIS.  
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One of the humanitarian dilemmas was raised in the Los Angeles 
Times. This concerns the question of how to win the Battle of Mosul and to 
free more than one million trapped residents without killing them.33 This 
apparently humane approach to fighting the battle is contrasted against a 
ruthless and merciless enemy. The Pentagon stated that “Islamic State 
jihadists are trapping Mosul’s residents to use as human shields. […] IS 
had for weeks kept Mosul’s estimated population of 1.5 million from 
escaping, with the start of the offensive offering them no respite.”34 
However, this contrasted significantly from news that was published just 
days earlier. Coalition forces had dropped four-page leaflets over Mosul 
and the ISIS-occupied territories warning of an impending military 
offensive to liberate them: “Residents are asked to stay away from certain 
parts of the city, avoid ISIS positions, remain in their homes and seal their 
windows and doors.”35 Thus it seems that the Pentagon statement that 
residents were being forced to stay as human shields as residents had in 
fact been advised to stay in their homes by the coalition forces arrayed 
against ISIS in the Mosul area. With such discrepancies in the message, 
such contradictions can erode the sense of public trust in the messenger. 
Not everyone was convinced that the best interests of Iraqi civilians were 
being considered: “Usually in war, the real losers are the civilians. While 
the Battle for Mosul has begun, the fight for normality is not on the 
horizon. In these types of operations, enemy targets are always drawn up, 
but we hear less and less about the civilians that need saving.”36 The 
enemy, ISIS, is depicted in a symbolic and simplistic manner as evil 
villains and at times as cowards. 
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ISIS fighters are shown as oppressive and ruthless terrorists and the 
“bad guy” in the Western mass media. This image is reinforced with stories 
of atrocities against civilians and the use of suicide attacks to ensure the 
message of a highly motivated fanatical and ideological opponent is 
communicated effectively.37 In spite of this emphasized trait of 
ruthlessness and fanaticism, they are also labelled as cowards in their 
defence of Mosul. News headlines directly point to the cowardice displayed 
by ISIS and especially its leaders. A selection of those headlines illustrates 
this point: “Islamic State Leaders are Fleeing Mosul, Says US General.”38 
“ISIS Leaders Abandon Mosul as Iraqi Military Presses Attack,”39 and  
“This War is a drag! Cowardly ISIS Fighters Flee Mosul Dressed in 
Women’s Clothes After Leader Orders Wives and Girlfriends to Evacuate 
the City.”40 These headlines seemingly contradict the narrative of the 
battle-hardened and fanatical enemy. One headline even promised a bigger 
prize in Mosul: “ISIS Leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi ‘Hiding in Mosul’ as 
Iraqi Forces Reach City.”41 Cowardice and hiding by ISIS fighters are 
highlighted in these particular types of news stories.  
In terms of how the Western mainstream media characterise the 
intentions and effects of the coalition’s military actions against ISIS in 
Mosul, it is a vastly different message to that used to describe the military 
offensive in Aleppo. The assessment is upbeat and positive in its 
communicated mood. It reports positive milestones, such as “Reaching 
Mosul Caps a Turnaround for Iraq Forces.”42 In other words, the Iraqi 
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forces have shaken off the ghosts of the past and are becoming an effective 
fighting force. This message is reinforced by stories that emphasize 
military gains, such as “Iraqi PM: Operation to drive ISIS out of Mosul is 
Imminent.”43 These headlines are intended to assure the war-weary 
Western public of an Iraqi military taking over the fight and its attendant 
risks, freeing Western soldiers from the dangers involved.44 They manage 
the expectations of the Western publics concerning the conflict. Another 
example of expectation management is found in trying to push the idea of 
victory, but with a caveat: “Iraqi Forces Fear Tough Battles Ahead After 
Quick Gains.”45  
The supporting role of the United States in training Iraqi forces46 and 
in preparing for the Mosul offensive47 is mentioned. Successes of the 
offensive are trumpeted: “In Wake of Mosul Offensive, a Tale of Two 
Villages.”48 It is a story of hardship and triumph, from oppression to 
freedom, by the local people and the military coalition against ISIS. The 
slow and steady military progress against ISIS is also emphasized: 
“Coalition Huddles as Forces Inch Towards Mosul.”49 This story is intended 
to emphasize unity and resolve in the fight. When the coalition forces 
engage in military operations they are characterised as “moving;”50 these 
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forces “push toward”51 an objective or “launch an offensive.”52 The rhetoric 
and deliberate wording of these military actions is either neutral or put in 
a positive context and light. The main point is that this is a good battle 
concerning the liberation and salvation of the local people.   
The outcome of the Battle of Mosul is critically reflected upon by a 
minority of journalists in the sample of news stories that were read and 
analysed. Robert Fisk asks if Mosul falls, will ISIS flee to the relative safety 
of Syria and if so, what then? He concludes: “the entire ISIS caliphate 
army could be directed against the Assad government and its allies—a 
scenario which might cause some satisfaction in Washington.”53 This 
possible scenario gives a good overview of the short-term geopolitical 
considerations and tactics in the Middle East. The issue of geopolitical 
influence in the wake of the liberation of Mosul has appeared in other 
articles:  
 
The offensive to liberate Mosul, which began in the 
early hours of October 17, is far more delicate and 
challenging than that of any previous Islamic State-held 
cities because of its size and because Nineveh province—of 
which Mosul is the capital—consists of the most diverse and 
ancient ethnic and religious communities in Iraq. Moreover, 
a dug-in Islamic State looks set to fight to the death there 
unlike in Fallujah where over 1000 fighters and members 
retreated from the town. Making it even more contentious, 
the geopolitical significance of Mosul has created 
competition between the federal government, pro-Iranian 
Shia militias, the Kurdistan Regional Government, Iraqi 
Arab Sunni factions, and regional powers to carve out future 
influence in the city.54 
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Thus the challenge of the Battle for Mosul is not the actual physical 
fighting that has begun to determine who occupies the territory, but the 
long-term political challenges and threats that shall emerge after this 
particular phase has finished. The current public relations campaign that 
is being waged in front of and with the mass media, especially given the 
disparity of military strength, is likely to be decided soon. The political and 
geopolitical challenges that emerge after this fight will likely ensure 
continued instability for some time to come. This task of recovery is made 
even more difficult owing to weak Iraqi state institutions.55 In this regard, 
the media narrative is a possible tool to realise these geopolitical goals by 
shaping public perception and opinion of these events.  
 
Analysis—Why Good and Bad? 
Although there is a clear and gaping discrepancy in Western media 
reporting on the Battles of Aleppo and Mosul, in which Aleppo is the bad 
and Mosul is the good battle, it has not gone unnoticed by astute 
observers. There are many similarities between the two battles: both 
concern the taking back of territory from antigovernment terrorist forces, 
both are key battles that may have a significant impact on the future 
course of the war against terrorist forces, and both involve a military siege 
of an area with a significant civilian population. The Russian or Syrian 
government’s message is seldom seen in mainstream media content, and 
even more rarely without some form of added interpretation. It does on 
rare occasion occur, as for example, “Russian Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov says Western outrage over a Russian bombing campaign in the 
Syrian city of Aleppo is hypocritical because Western governments are 
carrying out a similar operation in the Iraqi city of Mosul.”56 The Coalition 
Forces in Iraq, on the other hand, are often quoted verbatim without being 
challenged or interpreted for the reader.  
Russian and Syrian government air strikes have been focused on as 
cruel and deliberate acts of barbarity and a form of collective punishment 
against the civilian population in spite of indications that Jabhat Fateh al-
Sham are preventing civilians from leaving and using them as human 
shields.57 This is the narrative used to describe what is happening in 
                                                 
https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/unseating-the-caliphate-contrasting-the-challenges-of-
liberating-fallujah-and-mosul 
55 Malsin, J. 2016. “The Next War For Iraq.” Time, June 23. Accessed October 20, 2016. 
http://time.com/isis-mosul/ 
56 “Russia: West Hypocritical on Aleppo, Doing Similar in Mosul.” 2016. Fox News, October 
25. Accessed October 27, 2016. http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/10/25/russia-west-
hypocritical-on-aleppo-doing-similar-in-mosul.html 
57 “Zakharova: Fatah Al-Sham Using Civilians in Aleppo as ‘Human Shield’.” 2016. Fars News 
Agency, October 6. Accessed November 8, 2016. 
http://en.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13950715000846 
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Mosul, creating different interpretations of the same act in order to 
support the idea of good and bad actors in the two battles. Civilian deaths 
as the result of coalition and especially US-led air strikes have been played 
down to an extent. For example, the US government put the civilian death 
toll as the result of air strikes in Iraq and Syria at 42, while the London-
based group Airwars counted at least 1323 civilians killed and significant 
destruction.58 Amnesty International has been extremely critical of 
coalition air strikes, including in Syria, arguing that the US needs to be 
more open and honest about the civilian death toll.59 Accusations have 
also been levelled that the Pentagon goes as far as to ignore civilian 
casualties that result from air strikes directed against ISIS.60 Amnesty 
International produced a twenty-six-page memorandum that details the 
deaths and destruction of civilian infrastructure in minute detail (Amnesty 
International 2016). This is far from the praise that US air strikes were 
surgically precise and effective that appeared in some mainstream media 
news reports.   
A number of Western media stories have been debunked, which has 
revealed the methods used to plant information through news to 
manipulate public opinion. Scholars have demonstrated the role and value 
of penetrating news with emotional propaganda in order to sway public 
opinion towards a desired policy direction (Calhoun 2013; Carruthers 
2011; De Franco 2012; DiMaggio 2009; Eskjaer et al. 2015; Simons 2016; 
Willcox 2005). One article noted that there are two enemies of governments 
at war: “British wars abroad have two enemies. First, the official enemy 
portrayed as a monster whom we always battle with noble intentions. But 
second is the enemy within—us, the public. The danger posed by the 
public is that we may stop the elites doing what they want, hence we are 
subject to state ‘information operations’ to convey messages and obscure 
facts, usually via compliant media organisations.”61 One of these fed 
stories has been the alleged bombing of hospitals by Russia in Eastern 
Aleppo. This was given as a fact by the Syrian Observatory for Human 
Rights, but not one that could be confirmed by a briefing at the State 
                                                 
58 Malsin, J. 2016. “The Next War For Iraq.” Time, June 23. Accessed October 20, 2016. 
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2016. Amnesty International, October 26. Accessed October 27, 2016. 
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Human Rights Group Says.” The Intercept, October 26. Accessed October 27, 2016.  
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Department in response to questions by journalist Matt Lee.62 The 
bombings were also refuted by a group of Syrian doctors in Aleppo.63 This 
is more than a naturally occurring fog of war, but rather a deliberate and 
systematic attempt to shape public perception and opinion through news 
management.  
The situation implies that there is an attempt at propaganda to rally 
public opinion around the military operation, in which media are being 
used as an instrument of war to affect the opinion and perception of these 
two events that impact upon the political and military considerations in 
each of the conflicts as laid out by Payne (2005). This is due to the nature 
of the tangible and intangible (such as the desire and will to fight, the level 
of trust in the political and military leadership) elements of war (see 
Simons 2012) that can restrict an opponent whilst freeing one’s own hands 
if a war is successfully communicated as being just as opposed to unjust. 
This is what John Pilger describes as “invisible government” through the 
use of propaganda: 
 
Imagine two cities. Both are under siege by the forces 
of the government of that country. Both cities are occupied 
by fanatics, who commit terrible atrocities, such as 
beheading people. But there is a vital difference. In one 
siege, the government soldiers are described as liberators by 
Western reporters embedded with them, who 
enthusiastically report their battles and air strikes. There 
are front pages of these heroic soldiers giving a V-sign for 
victory. There is scant mention of civilian casualties. In the 
second city—in another country nearby—almost exactly the 
same is happening. Government forces are laying siege to a 
city controlled by the same breed of fanatics. The difference 
is that these fanatics are supported, supplied and armed by 
“us”—by the United States and Britain. They even have a 
media centre that is funded by Britain and America. Another 
difference is that the government soldiers laying siege to this 
city are bad guys, condemned for assaulting and bombing 
                                                 
62 “Moon of Alabama, A Desperate Obama Administration Resorts to Lying and Maybe More.” 
2016. Ron Paul Institute, October 8. Accessed October 10, 2016. 
http://www.ronpaulinstitute.org/archives/peace-and-prosperity/2016/october/08/a-
desperate-obama-administration-resorts-to-lying-and-maybe-more/. This is a deeply 
problematic source of evidence.  
63 Bartlett, E. 2016. “Syria Doctors in Aleppo Refute Western Media Lies.” Off Guardian, 
October 8. Accessed October 10, 2016. https://off-guardian.org/2016/10/08/syria-doctors-
in-aleppo-refute-western-media-lies/ 
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the city—which is exactly what the good soldiers do in the 
first city.64 
 
Others have also noted the increasing gap between what is reported 
in the corporate media and reality. A somewhat Orwellian twist has been 
noted in Western media reporting: “The corporate media’s ‘coverage’ of 
Syria adds a twist to Orwell’s dictum—inconvenient reports and facts do 
occasionally appear in respected newspapers and on popular news 
programmes but they are invariably ignored, decontextualized or not 
followed up on.”65 This does account for some limited diversity that 
appears in Western mainstream news reporting on these two events, and 
the fact that these rare reports remain somewhat isolated cases that are 
not followed up on. There have been some articles that have noted the 
similarities between the two offensives. One of these appears in the Los 
Angeles Times, “Russia Portrays its Aleppo Bombing as a Mosul-Style 
Offensive,”66 in which much more time is given to uncritical coverage of the 
response by US officials than to refuting the claim found in headline. 
Therefore, with an appearance of offering opposing views, it gives a 
subjective preference to one interpretation. Patrick Cockburn has noted 
the evident propaganda in the news of the two battles. He points to the 
mistakes of the past, such as in the lead-up to the Iraq War in 2003, that 
continue to be repeated in the present. He reflects on the lessons: “It is a 
salutary story because later in the same year in Libya and Syria opposition 
activists were able to gain control of the media narrative and exclude all 
other interpretations of what was happening.”67 The end result is to try 
and create a reality in which the reader is led to understand that good 
deaths occur in Mosul whereas bad deaths happen in Aleppo.68 This is, in 
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effect, political lobbying with emotionally laden and politically subjective 
information to give one side an advantage in the waging of war. 
 
Conclusions 
According to the research presented in this particular article, mass 
media has acted as an instrument of war as described by Payne (2005), 
which is driven by the highly politicised nature of this conflict. It is 
intended to alter and affect the balance of the intangible elements of war, 
which in turn affects the tangible elements in terms of selection and 
application of military operational choices available. It can be used to both 
constrict one actor’s ability to act and engage, whilst simultaneously 
freeing another actor. War, after all, can be considered as politics by other 
means, and this requires carrying public opinion through managing 
popular perceptions.  
This situation has driven a greater mediatisation of war (Hjarvard et 
al. 2015) as a means of communicating one’s cause and influencing the 
public (Calhoun 2013; Willcox 2005). This creates a situation in which the 
battlefield moves into mass media content in an informational sense 
(Thussu & Freedman 2003). News moves from an informing function to a 
propaganda function by priming and mobilising media audiences 
(DiMaggio 2009). What has been witnessed in the media content of 
mainstream Western news does fulfil the definition of news management: 
“The strategic communication of messages, via the media, in order to 
further political goals” (Lilleker 2011, 131). This is a game against 
geopolitical rivals with the goal of persuasion in order to gain a competitive 
political advantage over the rival’s interests.  
There is a distinct flavour of scripting and narrating characters into 
the story by assigning them roles to simplify a complex situation and make 
it more understandable to the audience in a manner that suits the political 
goals and objectives of the messenger. In the case of Aleppo, the Syrian 
government and its allies have been assigned the bad guy role. They do 
what villains do, and the Russian government plays the role of a spoiler 
supervillain who seeks to uphold the oppressively unjust and unfair 
system of the bad guy. The good guy role goes to the groups of jihadists 
and anti-Assad forces, who are the good and pure underdogs seeking a fair 
and just social and political system. There are also victims, namely the 
local population, although in this particular case, it refers specifically to 
those in the jihadist-controlled Eastern Aleppo. Last and not least in this 
particular story is the saviour, the United States and its various allies, 
which are supporting the good guys of the story in the best interests of the 
good guys and the victims.  
When applied to the situation in Mosul, the characters change 
somewhat and new ones appear in spite of the similarities concerning the 
two battles. The good guys are now the Coalition Forces that are aligned 
against the ISIS forces. Theirs is a story of liberation and freedom and 
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selfless sacrifice done in the name of the victims, the local civilian 
population. The bad guy role goes to the Islamic State and its destructive 
and oppressive presence in the area, whose fighters are depicted as 
hardened and callous oppressors, but also as cowards when confronted. 
Once more, the saviour role is awarded to the United States and its 
international allies, who are there to support the good guys to see that 
they prevail against the bad guys.  
The news management process witnesses some news as promoted to 
support these defined character roles in this geopolitical game. Other news 
that is harmful or contradicts this story is squeezed out or marginalised in 
order to achieve information dominance in the global information space. 
The likely intended outcome is to support regime change in Syria and to 
reestablish political and military influence in Iraq. It is a process that 
requires some measure of political legitimacy and support, which is 
garnered by managing the information flows in these events in order to 
shape public opinion and perception of the two battles, one “good” and the 
other “bad.”  
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